On the Impossibility of Supersized Machines by Garfinkel, Ben et al.
On the Impossibility of Supersized Machines
Ben Garfinkel , Miles Brundage1, Daniel Filan2, Carrick Flynn3,
Jelena Luketina , Michael Page , Anders Sandberg3, Andrew
Snyder-Beattie3, and Max Tegmark4
1School for the Future of Innovation in Society, Arizona State University
2Department of Computer Science, University of California, Berkeley
3Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford
4Department of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
April 1, 2017
Abstract
In recent years, a number of prominent computer scientists, along with
academics in fields such as philosophy and physics, have lent credence to
the notion that machines may one day become as large as humans. Many
have further argued that machines could even come to exceed human size
by a significant margin. However, there are at least seven distinct argu-
ments that preclude this outcome. We show that it is not only implausible
that machines will ever exceed human size, but in fact impossible.
Introduction
The history of life is often understood as a story of growth. If one takes the long
view, then one can trace an exponential curve from our minuscule earliest an-
cestors, which were little more than self-replicating molecules, to the substantial
creatures that we are today (Payne, 2009).
Although humanity became aware of this story only in the 19th century,
through the work of Charles Darwin, we have long had the privilege of witnessing
a partial recapitulation every time someone new comes into the world (Darwin,
1859). Before each person is a full-sized adult, they are first an invisibly small
cell.
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that human largeness has for thousands of
years fascinated many of our greatest thinkers. While some have sought to
understand the nature and origins of largeness, others have anxiously inquired:
Could there ever be something larger than a human?
Evidence of this anxiety can be found as far back as humanity’s oldest
recorded myth, The Epic of Gilgamesh, in which the monstrous giant Hum-
baba is appointed by Enlil, the king of the gods, to terrorize mankind (Sandars,
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
3.
10
98
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  3
1 M
ar 
20
17
1972). From this point onward, bellicose giants have been a consistent pres-
ence in our literature, appearing in works ranging from Homer’s Odyssey to the
English fairytale “Jack and the Beanstalk” (Homer, 1994; Anonymous, n.d.).
Over time, perhaps in response to our species’ growing mastery of nature,
it has become increasingly common to tell stories in which people are the ones
responsible for the larger-than-human (or “supersized”) creatures that threaten
them. For generations, audiences have been drawn to tales of frightful creations
such as Frankenstein’s monster, described as over eight feet tall and “propor-
tionally large”, and the golems of Kabbalah, which some rabbis feared would
grow large enough to destroy the universe (Shelly, 2008; Moshe, 1990).
This archetype has perhaps never been more prevalent than it is in modern
Hollywood films, however. Inspired by the apparently steady march of techno-
logical progress, and the wild speculations of futurists, our media has become
saturated with images of murderous supersized machines.
In the long-running Transformers film series, machines known as Decepti-
cons, each perhaps the size of a hundred men, repeatedly threaten to exterminate
humanity with their enormous metal bodies (Bay, 2007). Numerous entries in
the Godzilla film series feature machines so large that they can crush portions
of the Tokyo skyline with a single step (Honda, 1975). We find that the Matrix
film series, the Terminator film series (notable for its casting of an exceptionally
large actor), and countless others also feature supersized machines that seek to
cause the extinction of the human species (The Wachowskis, 1999; Cameron,
1984).
It does not help that in recent years a number of computer scientists, philoso-
phers, and other academics have publicly lent credence to the possibility of
supersized machines. There has been no shortage of media coverage of these
figures’ pronouncements.1
However, perhaps fortunately, all predictions of a coming age of supersized
machines are fundamentally misguided. We present seven distinct arguments,
each of which suffices to show that supersized machines are impossible.2
Arguments Against Supersized Machines
1. The Irreducible Complexity of the Human Body
Despite having been an active research area for hundreds of years, developmental
biology has hardly progressed beyond its initial stages. We are far from being
able to tell a story in all but the bluntest of terms of how a human zygote is
1In addition, it has become very common for articles on recent trends in computer science
to use terms such as “big data” and “massive neural networks” in ways that are likely to be
misinterpreted. Reading these articles, even ones that appear in highly reputable newspapers,
it is often unclear whether their authors are aware that the use of size language in these
contexts is purely metaphorical.
2It is worth clarifying that there are, of course, systems today that appear to exceed
human size in narrow dimensions. Lamp posts are one example. The predictions that we are
considering concern some more general notion of largeness.
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able to transform itself, over the course of two decades, into an adult that is
several orders of magnitude larger (Cameron, 2012).
Scientists are at the point of being able to identify traits that correlate
with largeness—certain genetic markers, for instance—but they have nothing
like a complete theory of the causal pathways that explain these correlations.
All attempts to construct such a theory have been stymied by the irreducible
complexity of the human body, which contains tens of thousands of distinct
proteins (Wilhem, 2014). It seems inevitable that, for this same reason, all
future attempts will fail as well.
Since we cannot comprehend the processes responsible for human largeness,
it follows that we will never be able to produce machines that surpass this
largeness.
2. The Meaninglessness of “Human-Level Largeness”
One simple reason that we can reject predictions of supersized machines is that
these predictions are not in fact well-formed.
The term “supersized machine” implies a machine that has crossed some
threshold, which is often denoted “human-level largeness.” However, it is not
clear what “human-level largeness” could refer to. Has a machine achieved
human-level largeness if it has the same height as the average human? If it
has the same volume? The same weight? Or some more complex trait, perhaps
the logarithm of girth multiplied by the square of height?3
When one begins to consider these questions, one quickly concludes that
there are an infinite number of metrics that could be used to measure largeness,
and that people who speak of “supersized machines” do not have a particular
metric in mind. Surely, then, any future machine will be larger than humans
on some metrics and smaller than humans on others, just as they are today.
One might say, to borrow Wolfgang Pauli’s famous phrase, that predictions
of supersized machines are “not even wrong” (Peierls, 1960).
3. The Universality of Human Largeness
A further reason why it is senseless to speak of machines that are larger than
people is that humans already possess the property of universal largeness.
By this, we mean that humans are capable of augmenting their bodies or
coming together to become indefinitely large, no matter the metric chosen. If a
human would like to be taller, they can stand on a chair or climb onto another
human’s shoulders. If they would like to be wider, they can begin consuming
a high-calorie diet or simply put on a thick sweater (Hensrud, 2004; Figure
1). There are recorded cases of humans joining their bodies together to reach
heights of up to 12 meters (Guinness World Records, 2013).
3Note also that humans vary quite significantly along all of these dimensions, and that
even among humans there is no single accepted measure of largeness (Pomeroy, 2015).
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Figure 1: There is no upper bound on how large humans can be (Gonzalez,
2017).
In short, since there exists no physical law to put an upper bound on human
largeness, humans can be of any size. It follows, then, that no machine could
ever really be larger than a human.
4. The Psychological Origins of Belief in Supersized Machines
By explaining why some people may be inclined to worry about supersized
machines, evolutionary psychology reveals that such fears are not rational.
It is only natural that our ancestors should have developed a fear of beings
larger than themselves. The greater a tribe member’s size, the more capable
they are of employing violent coercion against other members or stealing their
mates (Brewer, 2009). For this reason, vigilance toward the possibility of very
large things was a highly advantageous trait.
Although largeness now plays a much-diminished role, at least in Western
societies, there has been little time for human psychology to adapt (Donald,
1993). Furthermore, given the central role that technology plays in modern
life, we should find it perfectly unsurprising that many people (especially “al-
pha males” enmeshed in Silicon Valley culture) have come to possess a fear of
supersized machines.
Thus it is evolution, rather than logic or evidence, that serves as the true
source of the belief that supersized machines are possible. It follows that we
can safely assume this belief to be false.
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5. Humans and Machines Together Will Always Be Larger Than
Machines Alone
When writers discuss the possibility of supersized machines, they appear to be
missing a crucial consideration: No machine could ever be larger than that same
machine and a human together.
If machines are to play a role in pushing forward the frontier of largeness,
then this role could only ever be to supplement human largeness.
This is another simple reason why it is senseless to imagine larger-than-
human machines.4
6. The Hard Problem of Largeness
Suppose one were to concede that machines could become as large as humans, in
some sense related to physical extension (although this is of course impossible).
Even if this were so, there would still remain a second, more meaningful
sense of the word “large” that would not apply to these machines.
This second kind of largeness is the one evoked whenever someone is de-
scribed as “larger than life” or “living large” (Tom, 2004). Largeness of this
sort is a non-physical (i.e. non-natural) property, separate from the mundane
physical property that “largeness” most often denotes.
To build a large machine, then, in the meaningful sense, we would first need
to solve the “hard problem” of determining what this non-physical property is
and how it arises. However, it is not at all clear that the problem is soluble,
since the traditional methods of science seem equipped only to deal with ques-
tions that concern the physical world (Hall, 2010). Furthermore, the notion
of a machine “living large” strikes one as intuitively implausible (perhaps even
absurd).
Therefore, machines will never truly be large.
7. Quantum Mechanics and Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
Quantum theory, as traditionally formulated, divides the world up into mi-
crosystems and macrosystems (Heisenberg, 1949). Within microsystems lie
small objects, such as particles, and within macrosystems lie large objects, such
as humans.
The theory tells us that objects in microsystems may initially have no definite
properties at all, such that any question concerning a given particle’s position,
momentum, and so forth, will simply lack an answer. However, the remarkable
ability that humans possess, as a result of their largeness, is the ability to force
objects in microsystems to take on definite properties by performing “measure-
ments” on them. For example, if a human “measures” that a particle has a
certain location, then it becomes a new fact that the particle has this location.
4This consideration also suggests that credible machine largeness researchers ought to focus
on human-machine interfaces, which enable size-enhancing machines to be attached directly
to the human body. Existing work on stilts may suggest one promising research direction
(Smith, 2010).
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One of the great mysteries of quantum mechanics, that its originators never
succeeded in resolving, is the question of what distinguishes microsystems from
macrosystems (Bell, 1990). It seems that we are to understand that some fun-
damental line separates the large from the small, such that small objects exist in
a sort of limbo until large objects perform measurements on them. However, we
lack guidance on how to draw this line, and it is difficult to understand how and
why the line exists at all. The problem of making sense of this line, and thereby
uncovering the nature of largeness, is known as “the measurement problem.”
A partial answer to the measurement problem may be suggested by Kurt
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem (Gödel, 1931). This theorem was first
proved in 1931, although its full significance arguably remains to be appreci-
ated. The theorem states that, for any sufficiently expressive formal system,
the system must either be inconsistent or incapable of proving true or false all
statements that are expressible within the system.
To understand how Gödel’s theorem can resolve the measurement problem, it
is perhaps most useful to apply the lens of quantum stochastic calculus (Kholevo,
1991). QSC, as a reminder, generalizes classical stochastic calculus to cover
cases of non-commuting random variables, which are ubiquitous in quantum
mechanics. Take the quantum Stratonovich integral of a system operator, g(t),
which is given by (Gardener, 2004):
(S)
tˆ
t0
g(t′)dB(t′) = limn→∞
n∑
i=1
g(ti) + g(ti+1)
2
(B(ti+1, t0)−B(ti, t0))
Applying this expression, it is trivial to show that:
(S)
tˆ
t0
g(t′)dB(t′)− (S)
tˆ
t0
dB(t′)g(t′) =
√
γ
2
tˆ
t0
dt′[g(t′), c(t′)]
Now suppose that we would like to formalize this deduction within non-well-
founded set theory, to which Gödel’s theorem of course applies (Aczel, 1988).
Importantly, by assuming the axiom of anti-foundation we are able to introduce
into our analysis self-referential objects, such as Quine atoms, which possess the
property of being large enough to contain themselves.
Although the technical details from this point onward are unfortunately
too dense to include in a general-audience essay of this sort, assuming as they
do familiarity with constructive non-standard analysis, it suffices to say that
supersized machines cannot be made (Figure 2).
Conclusion
We have presented seven distinct arguments against the possibility of supersized
machines. While each of these arguments would be sufficient on its own, the
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Figure 2: Machines cannot be large (Gonzalez, 2017).
conjunction of them surely constitutes an insurmountable barrier to the belief
that an age of supersized machines lies anywhere on the horizon.5
Our conclusion is in at least one way a relief. There is no reason to fear
preposterous stories about towering Terminator machines.
However, our conclusion might also be taken as a sad one. We are the largest
things in the universe, and we will never be otherwise.
Fantasies of supersized machines hold an appeal, in addition to inspiring
fear, because it is tempting to imagine these machines as perfected versions of
ourselves. They are who people would be if only we were a little larger. They
are steadier, and more able to look down upon the world with a distant wisdom,
rather than becoming entangled in the insignificant details close to ground.
It can be nice to think that if we are unable to resolve our own problems
here on Earth, then maybe this is only because we lack the size.
A world in which we are the largest things conceivable is a world without
excuses. We submit that this is a good thing, however. It is time to stop
daydreaming about something larger than ourselves, and time to begin under-
standing how large we truly are.
5One may wonder why we have felt it necessary to demonstrate that supersized machines
are impossible, rather than arguing for the much weaker claim that supersized machines are
unlikely to be developed soon. The reason is that, counter-intuitively, many of the academics
who have expressed concern about supersized machines appear to accept this weaker claim.
They argue from the position, currently controversial among policy-makers, that it is worth
preparing for distant or low-probability events (Bedford, 2001). This position has led many
to stake out similarly provocative stances in favor of climate change mitigation, pandemic
preparedness, and seatbelt use.
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